





























A Case Study of the Kanebo Accounting Fraud: 
Fraudulent Schemes and the Change of Accounting Standard for Consolidation Basis
Eriko KAMEOKA
Abstract
　In 2005, it came to light that Kanebo had falsely portrayed itself as a profitable business from 2000 to 
2004 with a cumulative overstatement of income amounting to more than 200 billion Japanese yen. Kanebo 
was a Japanese public company established in the Meiji Period, and the auditor was Chuo-Aoyama Kansa-
hojin, one of the Japanese Big 4. The impact of this massive financial fraud was so enormous that both 
Kanebo and Chuo-Aoyama collapsed thereafter.
　The purpose of this paper is to analyze the Kanebo accounting fraud by considering its nature and 
cause. Materials such as articles, Kanebo’s financial reports and court records provide the basis for this 
analysis. From among several fraudulent methods used by the management to inflate its earnings, this 
paper concentrates on the main accounting scheme related to the scope of consolidation.
　From this research, it appears that Kanebo improperly avoided consolidating a subsidiary, Koyo-Senshoku, 
on its financial statements so as to avoid eliminating sales between the parent company and its subsidiary 
and to conceal significant operating losses of Koyo-Senshoku. In fact, the sales and losses were caused by 
less transparent transactions, known as “round-trip transactions.” Auditors find it difficult to identify “round-
trip transactions” because they are gradually converted from regular commercial transactions.
　In addition, a change of accounting standards was involved in Kanebo’s fraudulent scheme. In Japan, the 
accounting standard for consolidated financial statements changed considerably in 2000: from the “over 
50% stock owned” standard to the “effective control” standard. However, Kanebo continued to use the old 
standard. This suggests that professional advice of auditors to encourage unwilling managements to apply 
new standards is of great importance, and that misstatement risk of financial statements and audit risk 
may increase when accounting standards change.
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